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Abstract
Technological innovation is a key strategy for tackling climate change and other
environmental problems. The required R&D expenditures however are substantial
and fall on self-interested countries. Thus, the prospects of successful innovation
critically depend on innovation incentives. This paper focuses on a specific mecha-
nism for strategic distortions in this R&D game. In this mechanism, the outlook of
future conflicts surrounding technology deployment directly impacts on the willing-
ness to undertake R&D. Apart from free-riding, a different deployment conflict with
distortive effects on innovation can occur. Low deployment costs and heterogeneous
preferences might give rise to ’free-driving’ (Weitzman 2015): The country with the
highest preference for technology deployment, the free driver, may dominate the
deployment outcome to the detriment of others. The present paper develops a sim-
ple two stage model for analysing how technology deployment conflicts, free-riding
and free-driving, shape R&D incentives of two asymmetric countries. The frame-
work gives rise to rich findings, underpinning the narrative that future deployment
conflicts extend to the R&D stage. While the outlook of free-riding unambiguously
weakens innovation incentives, the findings for free-driving are more complex, in-
cluding the possibility of excessive R&D as well as incentives for counter-R&D.
Keywords: Environmental Innovation; R&D Game; Innovation Incentives; Ex-
ternalities; Strategic Conflicts; Climate Engineering; Geoengineering; Free Driver
Externality.
JEL Codes: Q55; O31; Q54; H41; D62.
1 Introduction
Technological innovation is a key strategy for tackling environmental problems. Im-
portant examples include CO2 abatement technologies (Bosetti et al. 2009; Perino and
Requate 2012; Poyago-Theotoky 2007) and ’breakthrough technologies’ like no-emission
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energy sources (Barrett 2006; Hoffert et al. 2002). A characteristic of novel technolo-
gies is that they require costly R&D to become available (Popp 2006; Harstad 2012;
Golombek and Hoel 2011). In the absence of a supranational entity undertaking or en-
forcing the development of these technologies, the main burden for R&D expenditures
falls on countries. Domestic interests and strategic considerations, however, often stand
in the way of implementing actions that would improve global well-being. The prospects
for successful development of potentially welfare enhancing environmental technologies
thus critically depend on countries’ incentives to engage in R&D.
In this R&D game, incentives can deviate from the global optimal for different rea-
sons. A possible cause for an overall insufficient willingness to develop technologies is
the public good nature of knowledge (Stiglitz 1999), leading to free-riding on other coun-
tries’ R&D efforts (Popp 2010; Hall and Helmers 2013). Another reason for inefficiencies
in the technological innovation process is that future deployment of the technologies,
usually involving significant externalities, will be prone to strategic considerations as
well. Anticipating the resulting suboptimal patterns of technology deployment, in turn,
has the potential to alter incentives for technology R&D. This mechanism has been ex-
plicitly raised by Popp (2010)1 and is present, yet less prominently, in a couple of other
contributions (Hall and Helmers 2013; Perino and Requate 2012; Barrett 2006; Hoel and
De Zeeuw 2010). It is this impact of anticipated technology deployment profiles on R&D
incentives that is the focus of the present inquiry.
The mechanism described by Popp (2010) is that R&D incentives are weakened due to
the anticipation of free-riding behaviour in future use of the technology. But free-riding
is not the only deviation from global optimal deployment that can occur in the context
of environmental technologies with transboundary effects. To explore the possibility
of other deployment conflicts, it is helpful to focus on a specific set of environmental
technologies. ’Climate engineering’ (CE), or ’geoengineering’, is the “deliberate large-
scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate
change” (Shepherd 2009). The main categories are so-called carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) techniques that aim at reducing the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
for instance by removing CO2 from the ambient air by means of chemicals (’direct air
capture’, see Keith et al. 2006), and solar radiation management (SRM) techniques that
would alter the earth’s radiation balance, for instance by the release of sulphur particles
(’stratospheric aerosol injection’, see Caldeira et al. 2013).2
CE technologies raise a set of new economical and political questions (Barrett 2008;
Finus et al. 2013; Victor 2008). While CDR techniques like direct air capture may, in
terms of the surrounding incentive structure, be very similar to the mitigation of green-
house gases and thus prone to free-riding (Chen and Tavoni 2013), the low deployment
1“Thus, without appropriate policy interventions, the market for technologies that reduce emissions
will be limited, reducing incentives to develop such technologies” (Popp 2010).
2For a recent review of CE technologies, see National Research Council (2015a) and National Research
Council (2015b).
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costs of SRM are expected to induce a novel strategic conflict, ’free-driving’ (Weitzman
2015): If preferences for global cooling are different across countries, the country aiming
at the strongest temperature reduction, the ’free driver’, will use SRM in order to max-
imize its own payoffs. Due to the low costs and global effects of SRM deployment, the
resulting amount of cooling may considerably exceed the level of cooling other countries
prefer. The domination of the outcome by one single country jeopardizes the global
benefits SRM could provide if deployed in order to maximize global welfare.
The present paper asks about the repercussions of these strategic conflicts, free-riding
and free-driving, on the incentives for developing such a technology. For this purpose, it
develops a simple game-theoretical framework in which two countries non-cooperatively
play a threshold R&D game in the first period and, conditional on successful R&D,
a deployment game for a transboundary environmental technology in the second pe-
riod. The general set-up combines well-known building blocks from the literature: The
two stage R&D game structure is borrowed from the industrial organization literature
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al. 1992), the threshold R&D structure
stems from Barrett (2006), and the technology deployment game is a standard public
good game (Barrett 1994; Finus and Ru¨bbelke 2013; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis 2006)
with heterogeneous players (Barrett 2001; McGinty 2006).
CE technologies are a fitting illustration for this general framework. Different tech-
nologies are expected to bring about the different strategic conflicts free-riding and free-
driving. Also, CE technologies are not developed yet and thus require sufficient R&D
incentives to become available.
The paper makes three main contributions. The first contribution is to demonstrate
that free rider and free driver equilibria can emerge in the same standard public good
framework. In comparison to Weitzman (2015), the smooth (inverse U-shaped) benefit
function is more tractable than a kinked benefit function. Also, the cost parameter in
the present framework plays an important and informative role while Weitzman (2015)
abstracts from technology deployment costs. The second contribution is to provide a
simple and tractable framework to analyse the impact of anticipated deployment equilib-
ria on the willingness to undertake R&D. This framework is capable of underpinning the
narrative of Popp (2010) of future free-riding weakening today’s innovation incentives
and able to identify novel effects of free-driving on R&D. The third contribution of this
paper is to offer a toolkit for disentangling R&D incentives into a ’non-spillover technol-
ogy’ part and a pure ’technology interaction’ part thus enabling a deeper understanding
of R&D.
The framework produces novel and notable findings. The main finding is that strate-
gic conflicts looming on the horizon directly impact on R&D incentives. It is this mech-
anism at work that weakens innovation incentives due to the anticipation of free-riding
(Popp 2010). In contrast to the intuitive repercussions of free-riding, free-driving has
more subtle implications for R&D: Not only can it happen that the free driver’s will-
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ingness to innovate is excessive so that technologies get available that ought to remain
undeveloped; it is also possible that a country is willing to undertake ’counter-R&D’ in
order to deprive the free driver of the technology.
The present study contributes to three strands of literature. The first strand of lit-
erature revolves around the implications of externalities on strategic interaction. This
literature can be applied, as the present paper does, to technology deployment, but the
most common field of application in environmental economics is mitigation of green-
house gas emissions. This literature started from Barrett (1994) and mostly developed
into the direction of International Environmental Agreements (for a survey see Wagner
2001). The present paper abstracts from any possible form of treaty, issue-linkage and
governance. The topic of asymmetric countries, a crucial feature of the present study,
has received attention in Barrett (2001) and McGinty (2006).
The second strand of literature this paper contributes to is environmental innovation.
Environmental R&D can either be analysed in a social planner framework (Goeschl and
Perino 2007; Teubal 1978), with regard to an intergenerational dimension (Goeschl et al.
2013), or – most common – the international dimension; the latter literature is closely
connected to the industrial organization literature on R&D games (Brander and Spencer
1983; D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al. 1992; Cozzi 1999). Several
studies analyse the effects of actually providing R&D incentives, e.g. using patents, and
the interaction with environmental policy (David and Sinclair-Desgagn 2005; Goeschl
and Perino 2016; Hall and Helmers 2013; Laffont and Tirole 1996). In terms of the
type of innovation, environmental R&D can either be cost-reducing (Bosetti et al. 2009;
Hall and Helmers 2013), pollution-reducing (Perino and Requate 2012; Poyago-Theotoky
2007) or, as in the present paper, technology enabling (Barrett 2006; Hoel and De Zeeuw
2010).
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on the economics of CE with contributions
focusing either on intergenerational heterogeneity (Goeschl et al. 2013) or heterogeneity
across countries (Moreno-Cruz 2010; Manoussi and Xepapadeas 2015). Most of these
papers however are interested in the interplay of SRM with abatement from which the
present study abstracts. It is closely connected to Weitzman (2015) who, for the first
time, analysed ’free-driving’ behaviour in SRM deployment. The new angle the present
paper adds to Weitzman (2015) is to put the repercussions on R&D incentives center
stage.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the simple game-
theoretical setting in which two asymmetric countries play a non-cooperative R&D and
technology deployment game. Section 3 characterizes deployment equilibria for the case
of symmetric countries and analyses the resulting R&D incentives. These findings serve
as a useful benchmark for the general case of asymmetric countries that is the focus of
section 4, the main section of this paper. Section 5 demonstrates how R&D incentives
can be disentangled into two effects that enhance the understanding of the complex
4
findings of section 4. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Two countries play a non-cooperative R&D and technology deployment game. In stage
one, countries simultaneously make their individual R&D investments for an environmen-
tal technology. The R&D game is a threshold public good game with perfect spillovers:
If the sum of R&D contributions exceeds a (commonly known) threshold, the technology
is in the second stage available to both countries; otherwise no country can use it. Con-
ditional on successful R&D, countries in the second stage simultaneously choose their
deployment levels of the technology. This technology deployment game is a standard
public good game with perfect spillovers. Each country bears the full (quadratic) costs
of its technology deployment; in contrast to that and as usual in public good games,
the other country cannot be excluded from the (inverse U-shaped) benefits. But, due to
heterogeneity in the benefit-function, a central feature of the model, this has a flipside.
Non-excludability also implies that a country cannot protect itself against undesired high
technology deployment levels.
This public good structure with asymmetric benefits is quite general and capable
of embracing a variety of technologies with transboundary effects and heterogeneous
preferences. An apt set of technologies however are the above mentioned climate engi-
neering (CE) technologies.3 What makes CE a good working example is that, first, these
technologies are not developed yet so that the relevant R&D question is whether they
are made available – in contrast to cost-reducing R&D (for instance Hall and Helmers
2013). Second, CE deployment fits well into the public good structure: Deployment costs
are borne by the deploying country alone while the effect of reduced GHG levels and
temperatures is inevitably global. Finally, and central in this paper, countries differ in
their assessment of an ’optimal climate’ (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994; Porter et al. 2014;
Manoussi and Xepapadeas 2015; Heyen et al. 2015); as a consequence, the assumption
of heterogeneous preferences for deployment of the technology is particularly reasonable
here.
The magnitude of deployment costs will crucially shape the outcome of the game.
Direct air capture, a CE technology of the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) class, is a
suited example for an environmental technology with rather high deployment costs; in
contrast, stratospheric aerosol injection, the best-known proposal for a solar radiation
management (SRM) technology, is a good example of a low deployment cost technology.
The rest of this paper will constantly refer to these two CE technologies.
The solution concept of the model is standard subgame perfection (SPNE). The
3It should be noted that the simple framework deliberately abstracts from dissimilarities of CE
technologies – how quickly they act and how big their unintended side-effects will be – that are crucial
in other contexts.
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natural tool to solve the game is thus by backward induction. In the following we will
explain the two stages of the model in detail, starting with the technology deployment
stage (2.1) and then turning to the R&D stage (2.2).
2.1 Technology deployment stage
In case of successful R&D, countries in the second period choose their technology level
qi ≥ 0 simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In terms of the working example CE, think
of qi as the reduction in global temperatures that is accomplished by either removing
CO2 from the atmosphere (direct air capture) or putting sulphur into the stratosphere
(stratospheric aerosol injection). The cost and benefit structure is of the quadratic-
quadratic type (Barrett 1994; Finus and Ru¨bbelke 2013; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis
2006). The cost function, the same for both countries, is
C(qi) =
c
2
q2i , i = 1, 2 (1)
with c > 0. Costs only depend on the private contribution qi. In contrast, benefits
feature the usual public good structure with perfect spillovers, such that benefits are a
function of the total technology level Q = q1 + q2,
Bi(Q) = b
(
aiQ− 1
2
Q2
)
(2)
with b > 0 and ai > 0. The marginal benefits dBi/dQ vanish at Q = ai which justifies
calling ai country i’s preferred technology level. A central component of the model is
to allow for a1 6= a2 and hence heterogeneous technology preferences. Without loss
of generality suppose a1 ≤ a2. Instead of a1 and a2, it is often more meaningful to
focus on the mean technology optimum a¯ = (a1 + a2)/2 and the preference asymmetry
a∆ = (a2 − a1)/2. The condition ai > 0 translates into the restriction a∆ < a¯.
The countries choose their deployment levels non-cooperatively so that standard
Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept. Denote the Nash equilibrium
of this game, to be determined in section 3 and 4, by (q∗1, q∗2). The social optimal
configuration is (q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ). The payoff of country i of this technology deployment game
is denoted pii(q1, q2) = B(q1 + q2)− C(qi).
2.2 R&D stage
In the first period, countries simultaneously choose their R&D levels ri ≥ 0 (the possibil-
ity of negative R&D contributions will be discussed in section 4.3). As in Barrett (2006),
R&D is a threshold public good game with perfect knowledge spillovers. If r1 + r2 ≥ R¯,
the technology is available to both countries. If r1+r2 < R¯, neither country has access to
the technology. The threshold R¯ is common knowledge. Modelling R&D as a threshold
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process – rather than cost-reducing (Hoel and De Zeeuw 2010; Hall and Helmers 2013;
Bosetti et al. 2009) or emission-reducing (Poyago-Theotoky 2007; Perino and Requate
2012) – is a realistic assumption in the context of technologies like direct air capture
and stratospheric aerosol injection because these CE technologies are at present merely
theoretical concepts and the R&D decision is hence whether to make them available at
all. The countries choose their individual R&D levels non-cooperatively so that, again,
standard Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept.
The analysis of R&D incentives crucially depends on how much the countries are
willing to sacrifice to have the environmental technology available.
Definition 1. Country i’s willingness to pay for the technology (wtp) is Ri = pii(q
∗
1, q
∗
2)−
pii(0, 0), where (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) is the Nash equilibrium of the technology deployment game in the
second period. The total willingness to pay is R = R1 + R2. Important for comparison
is R∗∗ = (pi1(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 )− pi1(0, 0)) + (pi2(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 )− pi2(0, 0)), the maximal amount society
would be willing to pay for making the technology available.
Well known (for instance Barrett 2013) is that the Nash equilibria of a threshold
public good game do not suffer from underprovision. In our context:
Lemma 1. If max(0, R1) + max(0, R2) < R¯, then r1 = r2 = 0 is the unique Nash
Equilibrium of the R&D game. Otherwise, all combinations (r1, r2) with r1 + r2 = R¯
and ri ≤ max(0, Ri) are Nash equilibria.
The intuition is that every country is willing to fill up R&D investments up to the
necessary threshold if the necessary contribution does not exceed its wtp Ri. The reason
for the condition ri ≤ max(0, Ri) in Lemma 1 is that R1 can be negative (see section
4.3). In this case, r1 = 0, and the technology is nevertheless developed if and only if
country 2’s wtp is sufficiently high, R2 ≥ R¯.
Lemma 1 demonstrates a further merit of the threshold R&D assumption. In general,
due to the public good nature of knowledge, we would expect total R&D contributions
in equilibrium to fall short of its optimal level (Stiglitz 1999; Popp 2010). At the same
time, and being the central topic of this paper, we also expect strong implications of the
anticipated strategic behaviour in the deployment stage on R&D incentives. Disentan-
gling both effects would be cumbersome. Due to the favourable equilibrium conditions
of the threshold R&D game, it is clear that any effect on total R&D in this model can be
fully ascribed to the anticipated strategic outcome of the technology deployment game.
In particular, this paper is not about equilibrium selection. Which of the, in general
infinitely many, R&D equilibria is more or less likely to become reality is not the ambition
of this inquiry. Rather, the focus is on (i) a comparison of R&D incentives across
countries and (ii) the question whether total R&D incentives are strong enough for
successful technology development. Both questions are fully determined by analysing Ri
and R = R1 +R2.
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3 The symmetric benchmark
This section is dedicated to the case in which both countries have homogeneous prefer-
ences for the level of technology deployment, a1 = a2, that is a∆ = 0. In a first step,
section 3.1 derives the deployment equilibrium, re-establishing well-known free-riding
results from the literature. Building on this, section 3.2 characterizes the R&D equi-
libria, demonstrating that the anticipated free-riding deployment profile weakens R&D
incentives. Thus, the first contribution of this section is to pin down the narrative of
Popp (2010), giving us confidence that the model is adequately designed for making
statements about R&D incentives due to anticipated strategic conflicts. The second
contribution of this section is to provide benchmark equilibria for the asymmetric case
a∆ > 0 that will be covered in section 4.
3.1 Technology deployment
This section derives the Nash equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) and contrasts it with the social optimal
configuration (q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ). The main step for deriving the Nash equilibrium is to determine
the reaction function. Given the other country’s contribution q−i, country i optimally
chooses
qi(q−i) = max
{
0 ,
b
b+ c
(a¯− q−i)
}
, i = 1, 2 . (3)
Recall that in the symmetric case a¯ is the global technology level that maximizes the
countries’ benefit function. If the other country’s contribution does not exceed a¯ (if it
does, qi = 0 is the best reply), the optimal response is to deploy some fraction of the
remaining amount a¯ − q−i that would maximize country i’s benefits, and this fraction
approaches unity as the deployment costs converge to zero. As usual, the condition for
the Nash equilibrium is q1(q
∗
2) = q
∗
1 and q2(q
∗
1) = q
∗
2.
Proposition 1 (Deployment equilibrium in the symmetric benchmark, a∆ = 0). Let
c > 0. The deployment equilibrium in the symmetric benchmark with a1 = a2 = a¯ is
unique and has the following properties:
(i) The contributions q∗i =
a¯b
c+2b are positive and monotonically decreasing in c with
limc→∞ q∗i = 0.
(ii) The sum of contributions Q∗ = q∗1 + q∗2 is smaller than the socially optimal amount
Q∗∗ = 4a¯bc+4b , and the fraction Q
∗/Q∗∗ decreases in c.
(iii) The equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) is not Pareto optimal. The social optimal configuration
(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) is Pareto optimal and a Pareto improvement to (q∗1, q∗2).
Proof. See Appendix B.
These findings are hardly surprising and, for abatement instead of technology de-
ployment choices, widely found in the literature (e.g. Barrett 1994). The key properties
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of the strategic conflict surrounding the technology use is that free-riding on other coun-
tries’ contribution exists, giving rise to suboptimal low deployment levels. The social
optimal configuration would make both countries better off, but is not stable against
unilateral deviations. The higher the deployment costs, the more severe is, in relative
terms, the gap between social optimal and actually undertaken technology deployment.
In that sense, lower cost technologies are not only beneficial because they boost total
net benefits, but also because small deployment costs alleviate the free-riding problem.
Regarding our working example climate engineering technologies, the findings of
Proposition 1 imply that, if countries are symmetric and hence regard the same global
temperature as optimal, any strategic problem that we can expect, irrespective of the
cost structure of the CE technology, is free-riding and thus underprovision of the tech-
nology. We would expect this conflict to be stronger for cost-intensive technologies like
direct air capture and significantly attenuated for low cost technologies like stratospheric
aerosol injection. We will see in section 4 that heterogeneity in technology preferences
substantially changes this favourable picture of low deployment costs.
3.2 R&D
Based on the results from the previous section we can determine the countries’ willingness
to pay Ri and contrast the total wtp R with the amount R
∗∗ a global planner would be
willing to sacrifice to make the technology available (cf. Definition 1).
Proposition 2 (wtp for R&D in the symmetric benchmark). The wtp in the symmetric
benchmark has the following properties:
(i) The individual wtp R1 = R2, and hence also the total wtp R = R1 + R2, are
positive and decreasing in c with limc→∞R = 0.
(ii) The total wtp R falls short of the social optimal amount R∗∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of Proposition 2. What is intuitive in light
of the deployment equilibrium in Proposition 1 is the decrease of wtp in the costs
parameter c: The higher the costs, the lower will be the levels deployed, and thus the
less willing are countries to spend money to get the technology.
The interesting feature is that the total wtp R is lower than what a social planner
would be ready to pay for the technology’s availability, R∗∗. Whether this has impli-
cations for the success of technology R&D depends on the threshold R¯. If R¯ is higher
than R∗∗, then the discrepancy of R and R∗∗ is inconsequential because R&D should not
proceed anyway. Likewise, if R¯ is lower than R, the R&D incentives for the (social de-
sirable) technology are strong enough. The divergence of R and R∗∗ however implies the
9
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Figure 1: Comparison of the total wtp (solid line) and the social optimal amount (dashed line)
as a function of the cost parameter c in the symmetric benchmark (a∆ = 0). The total wtp R
is the sum R1 +R2 with R1 = R2. The parameter settings are a¯ = 2 and b = 1.
existence of threshold values R¯ for which development of the technology should proceed,
but fails to do so due to weak incentives.
The reason why R falls short of R∗∗, to stress this again, is not the public good nature
of R&D. The threshold assumption precludes underprovision due to R&D free-riding.
Rather, the reason for R < R∗∗ is the anticipated strategic conflict in the technology
deployment stage. Foreseeing free-riding in technology deployment, countries’ incentives
to develop the technology are substantially weakened. The first contribution of section
3 is thus to underpin the narrative of Popp (2010) in a rigorous framework. The second
contribution is that the findings of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 serve as a benchmark
for the asymmetric case to which we turn now.
4 Asymmetric countries
This central section extends the analysis of R&D incentives to asymmetric countries.
In Section 4.1 it will become clear that the cost parameter c plays a crucial role in
the analysis. High cost parameter values give rise to deployment and R&D equilibria
very similar to the benchmark case. These ’free-riding’ equilibria will be covered in
Section 4.2. In contrast, and topic of section 4.3, low deployment costs substantially
change the strategic set-up, giving rise to ’free-driving’ behaviour (Weitzman 2015) with
far-reaching implications for R&D incentives.
4.1 Two types of deployment equilibria
The first step is again to look at the deployment stage and specifically the reaction
functions. The counterpart of 3, now for non-vanishing preference asymmetry a∆ > 0,
is
q1(q2) = max
{
0 ,
b
b+ c
(a¯− a∆ − q2)
}
, q2(q1) = max
{
0 ,
b
b+ c
(a¯+ a∆ − q1)
}
.
(4)
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Recall that a¯− a∆ = a1 and a¯+ a∆ = a2 are the preferred technology levels of country
1 and country 2, respectively.
Definition 2. We call a Nash equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) of the technology deployment game a
free driver equilibrium if the country with the lower preference for the technology does
not deploy in equilibrium, q∗1 = 0. If both countries contribute positive amounts q∗i > 0,
we call (q∗1, q∗2) a free rider equilibrium.
In particular, the deployment equilibrium in the symmetric benchmark is of the free
rider type. Weitzman (2015) gives a similar definition for free-driving in an n country
setting with a kinked benefit function and without deployment costs.4
As a direct consequence of the reaction functions in (4), the following Lemma presents
the key role of the cost parameter c in determining the type of deployment equilibrium.
Lemma 2. The technology deployment game has a unique Nash equilibrium if not c = 0
and a∆ = 0 at the same time. For a∆ > 0, the cost parameter c¯ := 2ba∆/(a¯ − a∆)
separates the two different strategic outcomes. The equilibrium is of the free rider type
for c > c¯ and of the free driver type for c < c¯.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The separating cost parameter c¯ increases in the preference asymmetry a∆ and van-
ishes for a∆ = 0.
Figure 2 illustrates Lemma 2 by presenting the reaction functions from (4) for two
different cost parameter. If c > c¯ (left panel), both countries in equilibrium deploy
positive amounts of the technology; for c < c¯ (right panel), country 1 would actually
prefer a negative deployment level to counteract the high deployment level of country 2;
being restricted to non-negative levels country 1’s best response is not to deploy.5 Table
1 summarizes the different outcomes.
In terms of the working example CE technologies the above findings are highly rel-
evant. In light of the sharp difference in deployment costs, we can expect CDR tech-
nologies like direct air capture to be prone to very different strategic incentives as the
low cost SRM technology stratospheric aerosol injection. Table 1 also demonstrates that
the framework outlined in section 2 is capable of reproducing the free driver behaviour,
established in Weitzman (2015), in a standard smooth public good setting.
The following two subsections will elaborate and compare the deployment and re-
sulting R&D characteristics for free rider (4.2) and free driver (4.3) equilibria.
4Two comments on the free driver definition are in order. First, the extension of Definition 2 to an
n country setting would involve the choice whether to speak of a free driver equilibrium when at least
one country or all but one countries do not contribute in equilibrium. Second, the free driver definition
in its current form rests on the impossibility of negative deployment. In the context of Solar Radiation
Management, the possibility of counter-geoengineering (Barrett et al. 2014) has been raised. In this case
negative contributions would be possible. The analysis of this possibility is left for future research.
5That the best response functions in the right panel of Figure 2 have the same slope is because the
case depicted there is c = 0. For a general c, the slopes are different; if c ≤ c¯, the best response functions
nevertheless do not intersect in the interior but at the boundary q1 = 0.
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(a) c > c¯. Free rider equilibrium.
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(b) c < c¯. Free driver equilibrium.
Figure 2: The reaction functions in the asymmetric case (a∆ > 0) for two different cost parameter
c. The parameter settings are b = 1, a¯ = 2, a∆ = 2/3 so that c¯ = 1. With c = 2 (left panel), the
equilibrium (1/6, 5/6) is of the free rider type. With c = 0 (right panel), the equilibrium (0, 8/3)
is a free driver equilibrium.
Table 1: Nash outcomes of the deployment game in period 2 for asymmetric countries (a∆ > 0)
specifying technology deployment of country 1 (q∗1), country 2 (q
∗
2), total deployment (Q
∗) and
social optimal total deployment (Q∗∗).
Type Free rider Free driver
c c > c¯ c ≤ c¯
q∗1
b
c+2b a¯− bca∆ 0
q∗2
b
c+2b a¯+
b
ca∆
b
b+c(a¯+ a∆)
Q∗ 2bc+2b a¯
b
b+c(a¯+ a∆)
Q∗∗ 4bc+4b a¯
4b
c+4b a¯
4.2 Free rider equilibria, c > c¯
The first part of this section specifies the free rider deployment equilibrium (the second
column in Table 1) and is thus the counterpart of Proposition 1 for asymmetric countries
a∆ > 0.
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Proposition 3 (Free rider deployment equilibrium with asymmetric countries). The
unique free rider equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) The contributions q∗1 and q∗2 are positive with limits limc→c¯ q∗1 = 0, limc→∞ q∗1 = 0,
limc→c¯ q∗2 = a1, and limc→∞ q∗2 = 0. While q∗2 is monotonically decreasing in c, q∗1
has a maximum in (c¯,∞). While q∗1 increases in the asymmetry parameter a∆, q∗2
decreases in a∆.
(ii) The sum of contributions Q∗ is smaller than the social optimal amount Q∗∗.
(iii) The equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) is not Pareto optimal. Local Pareto improvements consist
of (q∗1 + δα, q∗2 + δβ), where α, β, δ > 0. While the social optimal configuration
(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) is an improvement to (q∗1, q∗2) for country 2, this is in general not true
for country 1: For a∆ > 0, (q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) is not an improvement to (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) at least in
a neighbourhood of c¯.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Country 2’s technology deployment is very similar to the symmetric benchmark.
That increases in a∆ drive up q
∗
2 is simply because this implies a higher technology
preference, a2 = a¯+ a∆.
Quite different is the non-monotonic pattern of country 1. The reason that a decrease
in costs close to the separating cost level c¯ reduces the contribution of country 1 is
free-riding of the most extreme form: At c¯, country 2 contributes a¯ − a∆ = a1, exactly
country 1’s preferred level; as a consequence, country 1 does not need to make own costly
contributions. Not surprising, see part (ii), is that this leads overall to an underprovision
of the technology.
What is interesting is the look at the Pareto improvements in (iii): Small increases
in both contributions would make both countries better off, a simple consequence of the
underprovision due to free-riding; the social optimal configuration however is often, and
definitely when costs are low, not an improvement for country 1. The reason is again
that, close to c¯, country 1 is free-riding in an extreme way on country 2’s contribution
such that there is no room for better outcomes. As the appendix C.1 shows, a similar sit-
uation can also occur for high cost parameter values if the asymmetry a∆ is high enough.
What are the implications for R&D incentives? The following Proposition, the counter-
part of Proposition 2 for asymmetric countries, gives the answer.
Proposition 4 (wtp for R&D with asymmetric countries. Free rider). The wtp for
free rider technologies fulfils:
(i) The individual wtp for R&D R1, R2, and hence also the total wtp R are positive
and decreasing in c. We have R1 < R2 and limc→c¯ dR1dc = 0.
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(ii) Increases in the preference asymmetry a∆ decrease R1 and increase R2.
(iii) The total wtp R falls short of the social optimal amount R∗∗. The difference
between them increases in the preference asymmetry a∆.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 4 features strong similarities with the corresponding results in the sym-
metric benchmark, see Proposition 2. Most importantly, the total wtp falls short of the
social optimum (part (iii)), implying the existence of constellations in which a beneficial
technology is not developed for strategic reasons. The interpretation for R < R∗∗ is,
again, that the prospect of an underprovision of the technology directly reduces R&D
incentives.
Besides the intuitive finding that an increase in a∆ drives up country 2’s wtp and
decreases country 1’s wtp (part (ii)), a fact worth mentioning is that country 1’s wtp
R1 is strictly positive and flat at c¯. Both are direct consequences of the fact that, at
c = c¯, the technological deployment profile is perfect from the country 1’s viewpoint: No
private costs, q∗1 = 0, but the optimal total technology deployment Q = a1 provided by
country 2.
4.3 Free driver equilibria, c ≤ c¯
This section demonstrates that free driver equilibria are very different from their free
rider counterparts, both with regard to the deployment patterns, but also the resulting
R&D incentives.
The first part of this section specifies characteristics of the free driver deployment
equilibrium (cf. third column in Table 1).
Proposition 5 (Free driver deployment equilibrium with asymmetric countries). The
unique free driver equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) Country 1 does not contribute, q∗1 = 0, while q∗2 is positive, monotonically decreas-
ing in c, and taking on the values a¯+ a∆ = a2 and a¯− a∆ = a1 at the boundaries
c = 0 and c = c¯, respectively.
(ii) The sum of contributions Q∗ is higher than the social optimal amount Q∗∗ if and
only if c < 4ba∆/(3a¯− a∆) < c¯.
(iii) The equilibrium (q∗1, q∗2) is not Pareto optimal except for c = c¯. For c < c¯, local
Pareto improvements consist of (q∗1 + δα, q∗2 + δβ), where α, δ > 0 and β < −α. At
c = 0, the social optimal configuration is an improvement for country 1 but not for
country 2; at c = c¯, it is the other way round. There always exists an inner range
where (q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) is a Pareto improvement to (q∗1, q∗2).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
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By definition, in the entire free driver region c ≤ c¯ country 1 does not deploy the
technology, q∗1 = 0. The total technology deployment level thus equals country 2’s
contribution q∗2. It is not surprising to observe, and according to earlier findings, that
this level goes up as costs c decrease. It also makes sense that q∗2 = a2 at c = 0: If there
are no costs of deployment, country 2 chooses its preferred technology level.
Part (ii) shows that the total deployment level Q∗ can exceed the social optimal
amount. This finding, unknown in the standard public good literature, is another indi-
cation of the highly unusual and fascinating nature of free driver equilibria. One has to
keep in mind however that the comparison of the total values Q∗ and Q∗∗ is only one
dimension of gauging the gap between equilibrium outcomes and social optimal reference
points. Due to non-linear deployment costs, the distribution of deployment levels across
countries always matters.
Part (iii) describes the possible Pareto improvements. The constellation at c = c¯
must be Pareto optimal as country 1, by definition, cannot do any better: The overall
deployment level is at the optimal level Q∗ = a1 without own costly contributions. Once
c < c¯, however, the Nash outcome is not Pareto optimal, and local Pareto improve-
ments consist of country 1 contributing positive amounts, which already suffices to make
country 2 better off, while country 2, in order to make it an improvement for country
1, would over-proportionally decrease its deployment. Interestingly, the social optimal
configuration (q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) can only be a Pareto improvement if costs are in a certain interior
range; when costs get extreme, either to c = 0 or c = c¯, the Nash outcome favours one
country so strongly that the social optimal deployment profile is not attractive for both.
Connecting these findings with the respective part for free rider equilibria of Propo-
sition 3 gives a comprehensive picture. For country 2, the social optimal configuration
is always an improvement except for very small c. For c > c¯ this is because it overcomes
the free rider problem, for levels below but close to c¯, it saves deployment costs because
(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) involves positive contributions by country 1. For cost parameter values close
to 0, however, the benefits of being able to afford technology levels close to optimal
outweigh the costs of being the only contributor. For country 1, things are slightly more
complex. Starting at the low cost end with costs close to zero, it is clear that the social
optimal configuration would be an improvement; the reason is that here the free driver
behaviour of country 2 is extreme, implying a significant divergence between preferred,
Q = a1, and actual deployment. Also clear is that for values close to, and on both
sides, of the separating cost parameter c¯, country 1 is better off under the Nash outcome
because the overall deployment level is close to a1 and own provision costs are low, if
not zero. Ambiguous however is the case of higher cost parameters: As explained in 4.2,
(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) is a Pareto improvement only if the asymmetry a∆ is not too high.
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The main result in this section is concerned with the implications of free-driving be-
haviour for R&D incentives.
Proposition 6 (wtp for R&D with asymmetric countries. Free driver). The wtp for
free rider technologies fulfils:
(i) Country 2’s wtp R2 is positive and decreasing in the cost parameter c. Country
1’s wtp R1 is increasing in c with limc→c¯ dR1dc = 0; R1 gets negative for small c if
a∆ > a¯/3.
(ii) Increases in the asymmetry a∆ decrease R1 and increase R2.
(iii) The total wtp R = max{R1, 0} + max{R2, 0} is positive and decreasing in c. If
a∆ > (
√
2 − 1)a¯, the total wtp R at low values of c is higher than the the social
optimum R∗∗. If this is the case, country 1’s wtp R1 is necessarily negative.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration of Proposition 6.
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Figure 3: The wtp of country 1 (dot-dashed line), country 2 (dot-dot-dashed line), total wtp
(solid line) and social optimal wtp (dashed line) as a function of the cost parameter c for different
asymmetry levels a∆. The vertical dotted line is at c¯, separating free driver equilibria to the left
from free rider equilibria to the right. Note that R = max(0, R1) + max(0, R2). The parameter
settings are a¯ = 2 and b = 1 as before.
It is not surprising that country 2’s wtpR2 is positive and decreasing in costs. Also,
that a∆ drives R1 up while it decreases R2 has been found before and follows the same
intuition here.
Quite unusual however is the behaviour of country 1’s wtp R1. In contrast to
the free-riding case, see Proposition 4, and sharply different from country 2, here R1
decreases as costs go down. This new finding however makes sense in light of the perfect
constellation country 1 has at c¯. Relative to that, lower c values drive country 2 into ever
higher deployment levels and thus away from country 1’s preferred overall technology
level a1.
Related and also interesting to note is that in the free-driving equilibrium, country
1, although not deploying the technology, is in general ready to sacrifice means to get
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the technology. The reason for this positive wtp is that, despite excessive technology
deployment by country 2, country 1 is often better off with the technology deployment
pattern of country 2 than without any deployment.
This, however, can change for low cost levels if the preferred technology level is
sufficiently different across countries. Then, country 2’s deployment strongly exceeds
country 1’s optimal deployment level so that country 1 would be better off without the
technology. The negative wtp R1 in this case can be interpreted as the willingness to
undertake counter-R&D.6 This demonstrates that low cost technologies like stratospheric
aerosol injection that give rise to free driver behaviour not only suffer from strategic
conflicts at the deployment stage in some future, but that the anticipation of those
future conflicts may directly give rise to conflicts in the present.
Another peculiarity with free driver equilibria is that R&D incentives can be too
strong. The total wtp R, when defined based on non-negative R&D contributions ri ≥ 0,
can exceed R∗∗ when the cost parameter c is low and the preference asymmetry between
countries a∆ is high.
7 In Figure 3, the asymmetry a∆ in the right figure, a∆ = 1, is large
enough to feature R > R∗∗ for small c, while this is not the case in the left figure. If
R > R∗∗, the consequence is that technology R&D takes place (undertaken by country
2 alone) that should, from a societal point, not proceed.
5 Disentangling Effects
The purpose of this final substantive section is to get a deeper understanding of the R&D
incentives. It is helpful to entertain a thought experiment and artificially split the R&D
process into two stages. We write country i’s wtp Ri = pii(q
∗
1, q
∗
2)− pii(0, 0) accordingly
as
R1 = pi1(q
∗
1, q
∗
2)− pi1(qPriv1 , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:RPub1
+ pi1(q
Priv
1 , 0)− pi1(0, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:RPriv1
(5)
and similar for R2. The thought experiment consists of two processes. First, the devel-
opment of a fully private technology so that the other country can be excluded from any
deployment effects. The optimal technology deployment for such a private technology
6Whether counter-R&D is a realistic option remains to be seen. While it seems hardly possible to
remove knowledge once it has become publicly available, it seems less outlandish to assume that climate
engineering infrastructure (direct air capture facilities, airplanes designed to bring out materials in the
stratosphere) may potentially become the target of interventions meant to sabotage ongoing technology
development and hence prevent future technology deployment.
7The analysis in Proposition 6 (iii) is correct if R&D contributions are non-negative, ri ≥ 0. Al-
ternatively, one may consider the possibility of counter-R&D. For simplicity assume that one unit of
counter-R&D just cancels one unit of R&D. In terms of possible equilibria, note that with R1 < 0 and
R2 > 0 there is a unique R&D equilibrium, namely either (0, R¯) or (0, 0). The relevant total wtp that
decides about successful R&D is R = R1 + R2. It is easy to show (see Appendix C.2) that this mea-
sure is positive and always falls short of the social optimum; in other words the R&D incentives with
counter-R&D are never too strong as in the case discussed before. But also the counter-R&D scenario
gives rise to a peculiar outcome: For significant asymmetry between the countries, a∆ > a¯/3, the total
wtp R is non-monotonical in c.
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just balances private benefits and private costs with
qPrivi =
b
b+ c
ai , i = 1, 2 . (6)
The wtp for such a no-spillover technology is then RPrivi .
The second process is then to transform the private technology to a transboundary
technology with perfect spillovers that can be used by both countries. The willingness
to open up a private technology in that way, which will result in the Nash contribution
pattern (q∗1, q∗2), is RPubi .
The first Proposition analyses the incentives to develop a no-spillover technology.
Proposition 7 (wtp for private technology). The incentives to develop a fully private
technology are RPriv1 =
b2
2(b+c)(a¯− a∆)2 and RPriv2 = b
2
2(b+c)(a¯+ a∆)
2. Thus:
(i) For both countries, the wtp to develop a private technology is positive and decreas-
ing in c.
(ii) Increases in the asymmetry a∆ increase R
Priv
1 and decreases R
Priv
2 , and always
RPriv1 < R
Priv
2 .
Proof. Obvious.
The findings are hardly surprising. In the absence of any interaction effects with
other countries’ deployment, the lower the costs and the higher the preferred technology
level, the higher the wtp to develop such a private technology. Also, due to the absence
of interaction effects, the findings of Proposition 7 are valid for any cost level c.
The simple and obvious nature of the wtp for a private technology cannot explain the
rich findings and differences between countries and cost ranges, see Propositions 4 and
6. Before we tackle the asymmetric case, a few words on the symmetric case are helpful
to fully appreciate what is to come. In contrast to RPrivi , which is always monotonic in
c, the effect RPubi is not monotonic, even in the symmetric case. For a∆ = 0 we get
RPubi =
a¯2b2c(2c+ 3b)
2(c3 + 5bc2 + 8b2c+ 4b3)
(7)
with limc→0RPubi = limc→∞R
Pub
i = 0. The reason that R
Pub
i is not monotonically
increasing as costs go down is that opening up a low cost technology has only limited
benefits: If costs are low, private deployment levels are already close to optimal; hence
there is not much room for benefiting from other’s deployment. It is helpful to keep this
non-monotonicity in the symmetric case in mind when we now turn to the willingness
to open up a technology for interaction for the general, asymmetric case.
Proposition 8 (wtp for opening up a private technology). The incentives to open up
an existing private technology to a fully spillover technology are as follows:
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(i) Country 1. In the free rider region, RPub1 is positive and non-monotonic in c. In
the free driver region it increases with c and is negative for c <
4ba2∆
a¯2+2a∆a¯−3a2∆
.
(ii) Country 2. In the free rider region, RPub2 is positive and non-monotonic in c with
limc→c¯RPub2 = 0. In the free driver region, RPub2 = 0.
(iii) The wtp to open the private technology is always higher for country 1, RPub1 >
RPub2 , except for small c when R
Pub
1 < 0, see (i).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of both effects.
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Figure 4: Disentangling two drivers of the wtp for country 1 (black lines) and country 2 (gray
lines). The vertical dotted line is at c¯, separating free driver equilibria to the left from free
rider equilibria to the right. The functions depicted are the total wtp Ri (solid lines), the wtp
to develop a no-spillover technology RPrivi (dashed lines), and the wtp to transform a private
technology to a perfect spillover technology RPubi (dot-dashed lines). The parameter settings are
a¯ = 2, a∆ = 2/3 and b = 1.
Not surprising is the non-monotonic pattern of the willingness to open up a technol-
ogy that we find for both countries in the free rider region. This is essentially the same
effect that we already isolated in the symmetric case, see (7).
An interesting feature is that RPub2 = 0 over the entire free driver region. The reason
for that is that country 2, with country 1 in the Nash equilibrium not deploying at all,
is already using the technology privately.
In terms of interpretation, (iii) shows that over the entire free rider region RPub1 >
RPub2 , and the gap increases with the preference asymmetry a∆ (see appendix D). This
surprising finding can be interpreted as that country 1 is benefiting more from the public
good characteristic of the technology as country 2 does; country 1 is free-riding heavily
on country 2’s contribution.
Disentangling the different drivers also helps us to develop a more nuanced interpre-
tation of the free-driving zone. At first sight, country 1 could be interpreted as a loser
from the technology interaction because it is in the hand of the ’free driver’ and would
actually prefer negative own contributions. However, if c is not too small, RPub1 > 0
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(and in particular larger than RPub2 ) because country 1 still benefits from country 2’s
technology deployment. So the story is more subtle. Even though we are in a ’free driver’
equilibrium in which country 1 does not deploy, country 1 is still free-riding on country
2’s technology deployment. Only if the cost parameter c gets very small, country 1 is ac-
tually a loser from the spillover character of the technology. The reason that Weitzman
(2015) only covers the latter case is that in his model c = 0. Due to the general public
good structure with continuous cost parameter values c, the present model is capable of
generating more complex and subtle effects.
6 Conclusions
Technologies constitute a central component in the portfolio of measures against en-
vironmental problems. An important example is climate engineering (CE), a set of
environmental technologies that has recently received increasing attention. Novel en-
vironmental technologies, and CE in particular, however require substantial R&D ex-
penditures to become available. In a decentralized world largely shaped by domestic
interests, the incentives for innovation are crucial for successful R&D and thus deserve
a thorough analysis.
The present paper focused on a specific problem surrounding R&D incentives. The
anticipation of strategic conflicts in their future use, for instance free-riding, can be
expected to have repercussions on the willingness to develop these technologies. In fact,
the rigorous, yet parsimonious, framework developed in this paper has proved capable
of underpinning a narrative of (Popp 2010) holding that the anticipation of free-riding
weakens R&D incentives.
Starting from there, the paper turned to a different strategic effect. In sharp con-
trast to free-riding, free-driving occurs when the country with the highest preference
for deployment dominates the outcome (Weitzman 2015). This novel strategic effect
materializes – and the present paper has provided further support for this in a standard
smooth public good setting – if preferences for the technology deployment are heteroge-
neous and deployment costs for the technology are low. Stratospheric aerosol injection,
and in general SRM, are expected to exhibit these characteristics and may thus be prone
to free-driving outcomes.
This paper demonstrated that the outlook of free-driving has novel and rich impacts
on innovation incentives. Most notably, the anticipated future deployment conflict may
extend to the R&D stage: The free driver, keen to get the technology, may push technol-
ogy development even if this is against the global best. Accordingly, the other country,
foreseeing the free driver’s extreme deployment level, may be willing to counteract the
free driver’s innovation efforts, giving rise to an R&D conflict.
The present paper provides only the first step into the formal and rigorous analysis
of how deployment conflicts impact on R&D incentives. There are a couple of valuable
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extensions that future research should envisage. The first possible extension is to gen-
eralize the two-country setting to n countries. It is far from clear how to generalize the
definitions of ’free-riding’ and ’free-driving’ to the general case as it involves non-trivial
and meaningful choices. This is particularly true in light of the subtleties surrounding
free-driving that already emerged in the two country setting: The ’dominated’ country,
at first sight an obvious loser from the technology interaction, can for many parame-
ter settings be expected to substantially benefit from the technological interaction. The
question about winners and losers from the technology in a general setting is a fascinating
research question.
A second possible line of research is to modify the technology-enabling R&D frame-
work to cost-reducing R&D. This type of innovation is pervasive in environmental eco-
nomics (Bosetti et al. 2009; Hall and Helmers 2013), emphasizing the welfare-improving
role of low-cost technologies. The findings in the present paper suggest that free driver
technologies may be characterized by opposition against cost-reducing R&D. The coun-
try with the lower preference for the technology, concerned of being worse-off under the
free driver’s increasing deployment, may be willing to prevent cost-reducing innovation.
Another important extension of the existing framework is to consider governance
structures and treaty formation. The present paper deliberately refrained from dis-
cussing these issues. Accordingly, the focus was on non-cooperative behaviour and pure
Nash outcomes as the relevant solution concept. The motivation to do so was mainly to
develop a framework for making positive statements about the R&D incentives – in par-
ticular its deviations from global optimal – that we may expect without any governance
regime in place. The present framework is thus the ideal starting point to see which, if
any, governance structures or treaty options can help to overcome the strategic incentive
problems.
Finally, future research should also incorporate an angle from the CE literature by fo-
cusing on the interplay of technology and abatement. In particular, Moreno-Cruz (2010)
and Goeschl et al. (2013) demonstrated, in very different settings, that abatement can
serve as a tool to attenuate strategic conflicts about the use of a technology by shifting
their deployment incentives. A promising research question is whether abatement can
also play this role in the context of innovation incentives for free driver technologies.
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Appendix A Toolkit for proving inequalities
There is often the need to prove inequalities of the type P < 0 or P > 0 where P is a polynomial
in c. In the former case we want to find upper bounds of negative terms to get sufficient conditions
for P < 0. For free rider technologies, c > c¯, this is possible by replacing c by c¯. If we have
to prove P > 0 for free driver technologies, c ≤ c¯, replacing c in negative terms by c¯ gives the
needed lower bound.
Remark 1. For the proof of inequalities it makes sense to deviate from expressing a1 and a2 in
terms of a¯ and a∆; rather, a1 and δ where a2 = a1 + δ is the best choice. With that, c¯ = bδ/a1
Example If we have to prove −3a1bc2 +2δb2c < 0 for c < c¯, a sufficient condition is −3a1bcc¯+
2δb2c < 0, which is true because −3a1bcc¯ = −3δb2c. In more complex situations, we will indicate
the terms that are combined in that way.
Appendix B On section 3
Proof of Proposition 1 The social optimal deployment is q∗∗1 = q
∗∗
2 =
2a¯b
c+4b , so that
Q∗∗ = 4a¯bc+4b .
(i) This part of the Proposition is obvious.
(ii) The only fact that needs clarification is the behaviour of the fraction Q∗/Q∗∗ = (c +
4b)/(2c+ 4b): It decreases monotonically from 1 at c = 0 to 1/2 in the limit c→∞.
(iii) The condition pii(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) < pii(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) is equivalent with
a2b2c2
c3+8bc2+20b2c+16b3 > 0 so that
(q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2 ) is a Pareto improvement to (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2). The social optimum must be Pareto optimal
because otherwise there would exist a constellation that has higher total welfare.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) We have R1 = R2 =
a2b2(3c+4b)
2(c+2b)2) > 0 with
dR1
dc = −a
2b2(3c+2b)
2(c+2b)3) < 0.
(ii) The social optimal reference point is R∗∗ = 4a
2b2
(c+4b) , which obviously declines in c. The
condition R < R∗∗ is equivalent with a
2b2c2
c3+8bc2+20b2c+16b3 > 0.
Appendix C On section 4
Proof of Lemma 2 The reaction functions in (4) do not have an interior intersect iff c ≤ c¯.
The only statement that remains to be shown is dc¯da∆ =
2ba¯
(a¯−a∆)2 > 0.
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C.1 Free rider equilibria
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We have q∗1 =
b
c+2b a¯ − bca∆ > 0 because c > c¯ and q∗2 = bc+2b a¯ + bca∆ > 0. In particular,
q∗1 = 0 and q
∗
2 = a¯− a∆ = a1 at c = c¯. In terms of the derivatives,
dq∗1
dc
= − b(c+2b)2 a¯+ bc2 a∆ ,
dq∗2
dc
= − b(c+2b)2 a¯− bc2 a∆ < 0 .
Here, dq∗1/dc has a root at c¯+ 2b
√
a¯a∆/(a¯− a∆) > c¯.
(ii) From (i) we get Q∗ = 2bc+2b a¯. Easy to verify is Q
∗∗ = 4bc+4b a¯. Thus, Q
∗ < Q∗∗ is obvious.
(iii) The general directional derivative is as follows: Define fi(t) := pii(q
∗
1 + tα, q
∗
2 + tβ). Then
f ′i(0) is the (α, β)-directional derivative of pii at the Nash equilibrium. In this specific case
we get
f ′1(0) =
βb(a¯− a∆)
c+ 2b
(c− c¯) , f ′2(0) =
αb
c+ 2b
((a¯+ a∆)c+ 2ba∆)
and both expressions are positive for α, β > 0. Whether the social optimal configuration
is a Pareto Improvement for country 1 depends on the sign of
pi1(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 )− pi1(q∗1 , q∗2) =(
a¯2 − 6a∆a¯+ a∆2
)
b2c3 +
(
8a∆
2 − 20a∆a¯
)
b3c2 +
(
20a∆
2 − 16a∆a¯
)
b4c+ 16a∆
2b5
2c4 + 16bc3 + 40b2c2 + 32b3c
At c = c¯, this expression reads −16b3a2∆a¯2(a¯+a∆)/(a¯−a∆)3 and is negative when a∆ > 0.
By continuity, this extends to a full neighbourhood. For large a∆ the c
3-coefficient in the
numerator gets negative, implying that (q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2 ) is not a Pareto improvement for large c.
The situation is different for country 2. Here,
pi2(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 )− pi2(q∗1 , q∗2) =(
a¯2 + 6a∆a¯+ a∆
2
)
b2c3 +
(
20a∆a¯+ 8a∆
2
)
b3c2 +
(
16a∆a¯+ 20a∆
2
)
b4c+ 16a∆
2b5
2c4 + 16bc3 + 40b2c2 + 32b3c
and this is clearly positive.
Proof of Proposition 4 For the notation used in proofs of inequality, see Appendix A.
(i) dR1dc =
b2
2c2(c+2b)3
(
−2a1δc3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−3a21c3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+2δ2bc2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−2a21bc2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
+3b2δ2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+2b3δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
)
< 0 with equality
for c = c¯. dR2dc =
b2
2c2(c+2b)3
(
− δ2c3 − 4a1δc3−3a12c3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−4a1bδc2−2a12bc2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+3b2δ2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+2b3δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
)
which is strictly negative at c = c¯.
(ii) dR1da∆ = −
(a¯+a∆)b
2c+2a∆b
3
c2+2bc < 0 and
dR2
da∆
= b
2((a¯−a∆)c−2a∆b)
c2+2bc > 0 (because c > c¯).
(iii) R∗∗ −R = b2c2c3+8bc2+20b2c+16b3 a¯2 + b
2
c a
2
∆
C.2 Free driver equilibria
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Obvious from q∗2 =
b
b+c (a¯+ a∆).
(ii) Simple algebra.
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(iii) The directional derivatives are
f ′1(0) =
(β + α)b(a¯− a∆)
c+ b
(c− c¯) , f ′2(0) =
αbc
c+ b
(a¯+ a∆)
and both expressions are positive when α > 0 and β < −α. Simple algebra shows that
pi2(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) − pi2(q∗1 , q∗2) < 0 iff c < 4a2∆b/(3a¯2 + 6a∆a¯ − a2∆). Evaluating pi1(q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ) −
pi1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) at this point gives ba
2
∆
12a¯3+30a∆a¯
2+8a2∆a¯−2a3∆
9a¯3+36a∆a¯2+45a2∆a¯+18a
3
∆
. The numerator is positive due to
a¯ ≥ a∆.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) R1 =
b2
2(c+b)2
(
(2c+ b)a¯2 − 2ba∆a¯− (2c+ 3b)a2∆
)
with a root at cR1=0 =
(3a∆−a¯)b
2(a¯−a∆)
R2 =
b2
2(c+b) (a¯+ a∆)
2
dR1
dc =
b2
(c+b)3
(
δ2b︸︷︷︸
(A)
+a1δb︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−a1δc︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
−a21c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
)
> 0 with equality for c = c¯.
(ii) See (i).
(iii) Helpful notations: R2 = R
∗∗ at cR2=R∗∗ = − 4b(a¯
2−2a∆a¯−a2∆)
7a¯2−2a∆a¯−a2∆
. This is positive iff a∆ >
(
√
2 − 1)a¯. For R = R1 + R2, dRdc = 0 at cR′=0 = (3a∆−a¯)b3a¯−a∆ . This is positive iff a∆ > a¯/3
(same condition as ”R1 has a root”). If counter-R&D is not possible, the statement
that R is positive and monotonical is justified with two arguments: For all c > cR1=0,
where R = R1 + R2 anyways, this results from cR′=0 < cR1=0 (obvious because these
expressions only differ in the denominator). For all other c we have R = R2 and thus
R inherits the characteristics ’positive’ and ’decreasing in c’. That at the crossing point
R = R∗∗ necessarily max{R1, 0} = 0 results from the proof R < R∗∗ if R = R1 + R2
below. If counter-R&D is possible, R = b
2
2(c+b)2
(
(a¯2 − a2∆)(c+ 2b) + 2a¯(a¯+ a∆)
)
>
0 with dRdc = − b
2
2(c+b)3
(
(3c+ b)a¯2 − 2(b− c)a∆a¯− (c+ 3b)a2∆
)
. We have R∗∗ − R =
b2
2c3+12bc2+18b2c+8b3
(
(5a21 + 4a1δ + δ
2)c2 + 2a21bc−2a1δbc︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+2δ2b2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
)
> 0.
Appendix D On section 5
Proof of Proposition 8 In the free rider region: With C1 = b
2
2c(c3+5bc2+8b2c+4b3) ,
RPub1 = C1
(
2a1δc
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+2a21c
3 +4a1δbc
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+3a21bc
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
+2a1δb
2c−δ2bc2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
−2δ2b2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−δ2b3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
)
> 0
The derivative
dRPub1
dc at c¯ is a
4
1/(2(a1 + δ)
2) > 0. Thus, with limc→infty RPriv1 = 0, R
Priv
1 cannot
be monotone. With C2 =
b2
2c(c3+5bc2+8b2c+4b3) ,
RPub2 = C2
(
2a1δc
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+2a21c
3 + 2a1δbc
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+3a21bc
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
−2δ2bc2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
−4δ2b2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−2a1δb2c− δ2b3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
)
> 0 ,
getting zero at c¯. We have RPub1 −RPub2 = 2b
3a¯a∆
c2+3bc+2b2 > 0.
In the free driver region:
RPub1 =
b2
2(c+ b)2
(
(a¯2 + 2a∆a¯− 3a2∆)c− 4a2∆b
)
,
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which is zero at 0 < c =
4ba2∆
a¯2+2a∆a¯−3a2∆
< c¯. The c-derivative is, with a2 = a1 + δ,
dRPub1
dc
=
b2
2(b+ c)3
(
2δ2b︸︷︷︸
(A)
+2a1δb︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+a21b−2a1δc︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
−a21c︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
)
> 0 .
Clearly, RPub2 = 0.
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